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This article reconsiders the linear new economic geography model under hetero-
geneous agents developed by Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) by applying an analytical
technique introduced by Ludema and Wooton (1999). Two problematic aspects are
identiﬁed: ﬁrst, the bifurcation pattern for countries which diﬀer in amenities is in-
correct. I show that the degree of agglomeration is highest when trade costs are high.
Besides this minor problem, the second critical issue concerns the welfare analysis.
It is shown in this note that this model exhibits a latent tendency for overagglomer-
ation when trade costs are high and underagglomeration when trade costs are low,
bringing it in line with other welfare analyses of new economic geography models.
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Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) enrich the linear new economic geography model developed
by Ottaviano et al. (2002) with the assumption that the migration costs diﬀer between
individuals. These heterogeneous migration costs are captured by a stochastic term which
is part of their utility function. Indirect utilities are derived from quadratic quasi-linear
utility functions. They are modeled such that people exhibit love of variety and, hence,
all oﬀered products will be consumed. There are two types of goods which enter the
utility function: a homogeneous good which is produced under constant returns to scale
and with immobile labor being the only factor of production. And there are a number of
diﬀerentiated products which are produced under increasing returns to scale using a ﬁxed
amount φ of mobile workers. There are two countries in this model which are called home
(H) and Foreign (F). By assumption, the homogeneous good does not incur trade costs
when it is shipped from one country to the other. The diﬀerentiated product, instead,
incurs positive trade costs of τ units of the homogeneous good per unit to be shipped.
To guarantee that there is international trade, τ has to be less than a critical value τtrade
which depends on exogenous model parameters1.
People migrate whenever the interregional diﬀerence of indirect utilities exceeds individual
migration costs. Under these assumptions, a spatial equilibrium is reached whenever the
following condition is satisﬁed (see Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002, p. 163):





∗ − τ)(λ − 1/2) + d − µln
λ
1 − λ
! = 0 (1)
where ∆V (λ) ≡ VH(λ)−VF(λ) is the diﬀerence of indirect utilities as derived in Ottaviano
et al. (2002), λ (1 − λ) stands for the proportion of people living and working in home
(foreign) and C∗ and τ∗ are positive parameters consisting of exogenous parameters2. In
order to describe a complete agglomeration process, it is assumed that τ∗ < τtrade (see
Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002, p. 163). d ≡ dH − dF is a constant which measures the diﬀer-
ence of country-speciﬁc amenities. If d > 0, home has more amenities than foreign making
the ﬁrst more attractive. The logarithmic expression captures heterogeneity within the
population. Its functional form originates in the assumption that the stochastic part of
each individual’s utility function follows an identical and independent double exponential
(i.e., Gumbel) distribution. Here, µ is an exogenous parameter which directly measures
the strength of heterogeneity (i.e., the variance of the stochastic term). A spatial equilib-
rium is stable, whenever the slope of curve J(λ,τ) evaluated at the equilibrium is smaller
than zero (see Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002, p. 163).
1See appendix A for a deﬁnition.
2See appendix A for a deﬁnition.
1In what follows I address two critical aspects concerning the results derived by Tabuchi
and Thisse (2002): ﬁrst of all, the bifurcation pattern for asymmetric countries (d > 0) is
shown to be incorrect. To prove this claim, section 2 develops a technique which diﬀers
from the one used by Tabuchi and Thisse. Secondly, in section 3 this analytical approach
is used to show that the welfare analysis for asymmetric countries derived by the two
authors is not correct. Furthermore, this technique sheds light on the welfare properties
of this linear model when countries are symmetric (d = 0).
2 Bifurcation pattern for asymmetric countries
The divergence pattern for asymmetric countries (d > 0) shown by Fig. 1 in Tabuchi and
Thisse (2002, p. 165) is not correct. To see why, it is convenient to apply a technique ﬁrst
used by Ludema and Wooton (1999) and to decompose the equilibrium condition given
by Eq. (1) into two separate functions. The ﬁrst two terms of J(·) are the diﬀerence
of indirect utilities including diﬀerences in amenities. Following Ludema and Wooton
(1999), I will refer to this curve as labor demand (LD in short).
LD ≡ C
∗τ(τ
∗ − τ)(λ − 1/2) + d (2)
The coeﬃcient of the linear argument (λ − 1/2) is negatively quadratic in τ and takes
on the value zero when τ = τ∗ and τ = 0. Consequently, if trade costs are greater than
τ∗ the labor demand curve is negatively sloped, whereas the gradient coeﬃcient takes on
positive values for all values of τ between zero and τ∗. Standard analysis reveals that for
τ = τ∗/2 the gradient is at its maximum. d does not inﬂuence the slope of the function
but rather shifts the curve upwards.
The third term of J(·) shall be called labor supply (LS in short) and captures the het-





Diﬀerentiating LS with respect to λ shows that the curve slopes upwards. As λ → 1
(λ → 0) LS tends towards (negative) inﬁnity.
From Eq.(1) one may conclude that the necessary condition for spatial equilibria J(·)
! = 0
is satisﬁed by each λ at which LD and LS intersect. Such equilibria are stable if at
points of intersection the slope of LD is smaller than the slope of LS. Figure 1 depicts
the labor supply curve and labor demand curves for three diﬀerent levels of trade costs
(τtrade,τ∗/2 and τ = 0). Consequently, λ∗
2 and λ∗
1 in ﬁgure 1 mark stable equilibria,
whereas equilibrium λ∗
0 is instable.
2Figure 1: Labor demand and labor supply when d > 0
Let me concentrate on the evolution of λ∗
2 with respect to falling trade costs. It becomes
clear that the equilibrium share of mobile workers increases with falling trade costs as LD
rotates counter-clockwise as long as trade costs are greater than τ∗/2. When τ = τ∗/2,
the slope of the labor demand curve is steepest and, consequently, λ∗
2 takes on its greatest
value. When τ continues to fall, LD rotates clockwise and, therefore, the equilibrium
share λ∗
2 decreases. Once trade costs have reached the lowest value possible (τ = 0),
the slope of LD is zero. The labor demand curve is then parallel to the horizontal axis.
From this, it becomes clear that the equilibrium share of skilled industry takes on its
lowest value when trade costs are close to the critical value of τtrade. When trade costs are
zero, the degree of agglomeration is greater than at τ = τtrade. This reveals the mistake
in Tabuchi and Thisse (2002, p. 165), ﬁgure 1. The corresponding divergence pattern
generated by falling trade costs is shown in ﬁgure 2. Bold (dashed) lines mark stable
(instable) equilibria.
Figure 2: Divergence pattern for falling trade costs when d > 03
33 Welfare analysis
The comparison of agglomeration induced by market forces and by a social planner pre-
sented in Tabuchi and Thisse (2002) can be shown to be incorrect for asymmetric countries
(d > 0). Furthermore, when countries are symmetric (d = 0), clear patterns concerning
over- and underagglomeration can be worked out.
The underlying utility functions being quasi-linear, a utilitarian welfare approach may
be justiﬁed. Maximizing the overall sum of indirect utilities with respect to λ leads to
the following ﬁrst-order condition for extrema of the global welfare function W(·) (see




o − τ)(λ − 1/2) + d − µln
λ
1 − λ
! = 0 (4)
Here, Co and τo are positive parameters which depend on exogenous parameters4 and it
holds true that Co > C∗ and τo < τ∗ 5. Eq. (4) has a qualitatively identical structure
to Eq. (1). Therefore, W 0(·) can be decomposed into a linear function which embraces
the ﬁrst two terms of W 0(·) and into the labor supply curve LS which is the third term of
W 0(·) and identical to the market labor supply stated in Eq. 3. The linear function shall
be called "planner curve" (PC in short).
PC ≡ C
oτ(τ
o − τ)(λ − 1/2) + d (5)
Due to qualitatively identical functional structures, the evolution of the slope of PC with
respect to falling trade costs is identical to LD, with τo instead of τ∗, indicating the
critical level of trade costs at which the sign of the slope of PC turns from negative to
positive.
Analogous to the previous section, the ﬁrst-order condition of welfare extrema is satisﬁed
at the point(s) of intersection of PC and LS. A local maximum obtains if the second
derivative of W(·) evaluated at this point is less than zero. Therefore, the slopes of PC and
LS reveal the kind of extremum: Whenever the slope of PC is smaller than the slope of LS
at the point(s) of intersection, the global welfare function will exhibit a local maximum.
Figure 3 shows the decomposition of W 0(·) and the evolution of welfare extrema. λo
1
and λo
2 mark local welfare maxima, whereas λo
0 is a local minimum. When countries are
asymmetric in amenities, the global welfare level at λo
1 is inferior to the welfare at λo
2 (see
Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002, p. 170). Therefore, when the market outcome and socially
3The bifurcation is shown for parameter values a = 2,b = 1,A = 65,L = 1,c = 0.25,φ = 2,µ =
0.06,d = 0.04.
4See appendix A for deﬁnitions.
5See appendix A.
4optimal agglomeration are compared, λo
1 can be ruled out making it completely suﬃcient
to concentrate on λo
2.
Figure 3: Planner curve and labor supply when d > 0
It is straightforward that a social planner will prefer more (less) agglomeration than the
market outcome if the level of partial agglomeration at which PC and LS intersect is
greater (smaller) than the degree of agglomeration at which LD and LS intersect. As
PC and LD are linear curves, this issue can be reduced to a comparison of slopes -
whenever the slope of PC is greater (less) than the slope of LD, the market will exhibit
underagglomeration (overagglomeration). Subtracting the slope of PC from the slope of
LD reveals that the slope of PC is greater (less) if trade costs are lower (greater) than




Co − C∗ > 0 (6)
Subtracting τc from τo reveals that sgn(τo − τc) = sgn(τ∗ − τo) > 0. As the latter holds
true (see before), τc is always smaller than τo and τ∗. Furthermore, τ∗ is assumed to
be smaller than τtrade so that there is no such case where τc can be greater than τtrade.
This is in contrast to what is claimed in Tabuchi and Thisse (2002, p. 171). Figure 4
summarizes the results and shows the evolution of both slopes with respect to the level
of trade costs7.
When countries are symmetric (d = 0) the position of τc relative to τo/2 and τ∗/2 (i.e.,
the levels of trade costs which maximize the slope of PC and LD) as well as the degree of
heterogeneity inﬂuence the shape of bifurcation patterns which include both the degree of
partial agglomeration by market forces and the social planner. It is important to observe
6It can be shown that Coτo − C∗τ∗ > 0 and Co − C∗ > 0; see appendix A.
7This is in the spirit of Pﬂüger and Südekum (2007). In analogy to their analysis, the slopes indicate
the private net agglomeration force for the market and the social net agglomeration force for the social
planner, respectively. The vertical diﬀerence between these slopes can then be interpreted as the net
pecuniary externality associated with the mobiliy of agents.
5Figure 4: The slope of the labor demand and the planner curve8
that the exact position of τc relative to τ∗/2 and τo/2 is parameter dependent. If returns
to scale (proportionally measured by φ) are suﬃciently high and the ease of substitution
(proportionally measured by c) is suﬃciently low, then τc will be greater than τ∗/2 9.
Whenever this is the case, the maximum slope of PC will be greater than the maximum
slope of LD10. Such a situation is shown in ﬁgure 5. If returns to scale are suﬃciently
low and the ease of substitution is suﬃciently high, then τc will be smaller than τo/2 11.
Figure 6 depicts this situation. The parameters may also be such that τc lies between
τo/2 and τ∗/2 as shown by ﬁgure 4.
Figure 5: Slopes when φ is large and c is small12
8The slopes are depicted for parameter values a = 1,b = 1,A = 65,L = 1,c = 1.5,φ = 1; see appendix
B.1 for further details.
9See appendix A.
10It holds true that if τc − τ∗/2 > 0 ⇒ Coτo2 − C∗τ∗2 > 0; see appendix A.
11See appendix A.
12The slopes are depicted setting a = 1,b = 1,A = 65,L = 1,c = 0.1,φ = 2, see appendix B.2 for
further details.
6Figure 6: Slopes when φ is small and c is large13
Next, consider the impact of heterogeneity: the market (the social planner) will partially
agglomerate whenever the slope of LD (PC) is greater than the slope of LS evaluated at
λ = 0.5 (i.e., 4µ) (see Tabuchi and Thisse, 2002, p. 166). Agglomeration forces are then
stronger than the dispersion force originating in heterogeneity. Three diﬀerent cases can
be distinguished: First of all, when there is no heterogeneity (i.e., µ = 0), the model leads
to “bang-bang” solutions known from core-periphery models and only overagglomeration
becomes visible for trade costs between τ∗ and τo. For trade costs greater than τ∗ or
smaller than τo market and socially optimal concentration coincide. Secondly, whenever
the degree of heterogeneity is low such that 4µ is smaller than the slope of LD or PC
evaluated at τc, bifurcation diagrams will show overagglomeration for levels of trade costs
greater than τc, whereas there is underagglomeration for trade costs lower than τc (see
ﬁgure 5, 4µ1 and ﬁgure 6, 4µ3). And thirdly, for values of 4µ greater than this critical
threshold, the shape of bifurcation patterns depends on the relative position of τc. If τc
is greater than τ∗/2, bifurcation diagrams exhibit only underagglomeration (see ﬁgure 5,
4µ2). If τc is smaller than τo/2, only overagglomeration becomes visible (compare ﬁgure
6, 4µ4). If τc lies between these levels, there are three characteristic regions: ﬁrst, over-
agglomeration will be found for high levels of trade costs (the social planner will keep
people dispersed). This is followed by an interval of τ where both the market and the
social planner will exhibit dispersion. And lastly, when trade costs continue to fall, there
might be underagglomeration as market forces will lead to dispersion whereas the social
planner might prefer some level of partial agglomeration. The latter depends on whether
there is an interval of trade costs for which the slope of PC is greater than the dispersion
force 4µ (see ﬁgure 4, 4µ).
Consequently, there are clear patterns which determine the shape of the bifurcation dia-
13The slopes are shown for parameter values a = 1,b = 1,A = 65,L = 1,c = 2.1,φ = 0.6; see appendix
B.3 for further details.
7gram of the equilibrium and the optimum, but there is no robust result - whether there
is over- or underagglomeration depends on the actual values of model parameters.
However, when countries are asymmetric due to amenity diﬀerences, there is an unam-
biguous and robust pattern for bifurcation diagrams of the equilibrium and the optimum.
With interregional diﬀerences in "ﬁrst nature", partial agglomeration in home obtains by
necessity at any level of trade costs smaller than τtrade, both in the equilibrium and in the
optimum (see ﬁgure 1 for the market). The greater the slope of PC (LD), the greater
is the degree of partial agglomeration. Fig. 4 shows that as long as τ > τc, the slope of
LD will be greater than the slope of PC. Consequently, market forces lead to more ag-
glomeration than a social planner would prefer, which is equivalent to overagglomeration.
When trade costs are lower than τc, the slope of PC exceeds the slope of LD leading to
market underagglomeration. Figure 7 shows the bifurcation pattern of market forces and
a social planner for d > 0. Bold blue lines mark agglomeration by market forces, light
gray lines show the degree of socially optimal agglomeration. The position of τc relative
to the levels of trade costs which maximize the slope of LD and PC (i.e., τ∗/2 and τo/2)
does not qualitatively inﬂuence the result. Consequently, if d > 0, there is no such case
where market forces lead to overall overagglomeration, nor is it possible that the market
exhibits excessive agglomeration for low levels of τ.
Figure 7: Socially optimal agglomeration in comparison to the market outcome14
4 Conclusion
This linear new economic geography model exhibits a tendency for overagglomeration
when trade costs are high, whereas it has a tendency for underagglomeration when trade
costs are low. This is unambiguously revealed by the presented slope diagrams. When
14Numerical evaluation setting a = 1,b = 1,A = 65,L = 1,c = 0.1,φ = 2,µ = 0.07,d = 0.06.
8countries are symmetric in amenities, this welfare property does not necessarily become
visible in bifurcation diagrams, as they map functions for only one particular set of param-
eters. When heterogeneity is suﬃciently small, divergence patterns will show overagglom-
eration which converts to underagglomeration once trade costs have fallen below a critical
level. If people are characterized by strong heterogeneity, divergence patterns will show
either overagglomeration, underagglomeration or a combination of both, depending on
model parameters. When countries are asymmetric in amenities, comparative bifurcation
diagrams are qualitatively identical and robust. This is due to that fact that every level
of trade costs is unambiguously translated into a speciﬁc level of partial agglomeration.
Furthermore, it becomes clear that the ineﬃciency of market forces originates solely in
the underlying market model of imperfect competition. Taste heterogeneity as well as
amenity diﬀerences between countries are considered in the same way by a social planner
and by market forces.
This result is qualitatively similar to what has been worked out by Pﬂüger and Südekum
(2007). Assuming logarithmic quasi-linear utility functions, they show that there is market
overagglomeration for high values of trade costs, whereas one observes market underag-
glomeration once trade costs have fallen below a critical threshold. Like in this article,
this welfare property remains latent unless a dispersion force is introduced. Furthermore,
they are also able to show that the ineﬃciency originates solely in the market model and
not in the dispersion force. This similarity between Pﬂüger and Südekum (2007) and the
ﬁndings presented in this article is very reassuring, as it seems that there is a robustness
concerning the welfare aspects of new economic geography models with mobile labor.
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9A Parameter deﬁnitions and derivations
C
∗ ≡ [2bφ(3bφ + 3cL + cLA) + c
2L(LA + L)]
L(bφ + cL)
2φ2(2bφ + cL)2 > 0 (7)
C
o ≡
[2bφ + c(LA + L)]L





































∗) = sgn(B2) where (13)
B2 ≡ 5bφ + 3cL > 0
sgn(τ
∗ − τ
o) = sgn(B3) where (14)






∗/2) = sgn(B4) where (15)
B4 ≡ 6b
2φ































































∗) = sgn(B7) where (18)
B7 ≡ 30b
4φ
4 + 45b
3φ
3cL + 7b
3φ
3cLA + 3b
2φ
2c
2LLA + 15b
2φ
2c
2L
2 −
− 4bφc
3L
2LA − 4bφc
3L
3 − 2c
4L
3LA − 2c
4L
4
B Numerical analysis
B.1 Figure 4
τtrade = 0.571429
τ
∗ = 0.0669456
τ
c = 0.0240773
τ
∗/2 = 0.0334728
τ
o/2 = 0.019802
B.2 Figure 5
τtrade = 0.97561
τ
∗ = 0.956421
τ
c = 0.66595
τ
∗/2 = 0.478211
B.3 Figure 6
τtrade = 0.363636
τ
∗ = 0.0309957
τ
c = 0.00747957
τ
o/2 = 0.00858369
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